Pathologies of Security Governance: Efforts Against Human Trafficking in Europe by Friesendorf, Cornelius
 http://sdi.sagepub.com/
Security Dialogue
 http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/38/3/379
The online version of this article can be found at:
 
DOI: 10.1177/0967010607081518
 2007 38: 379Security Dialogue
Cornelius Friesendorf
Pathologies of Security Governance: Efforts Against Human Trafficking in Europe
 
 
Published by:
 http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
 
 
 International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
 can be found at:Security DialogueAdditional services and information for 
 
 
 
 
 http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: 
 
 http://sdi.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 
 http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/38/3/379.refs.htmlCitations: 
 
 What is This?
 
- Aug 29, 2007Version of Record >> 
 at LMU Muenchen on June 17, 2013sdi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Pathologies of Security Governance: 
Efforts Against Human Trafficking 
in Europe
CORNELIUS FRIESENDORF*
Geschwister-Scholl-Institute, Ludwig-Maximilians-University, 
Munich, Germany
The trafficking of women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploita-
tion has reportedly been booming in Europe since the 1990s. Govern-
ments, international organizations, and private actors have addressed
the causes and consequences of sex trafficking in various ways. This
article shows that the concept of security governance helps to under-
stand efforts against human trafficking and their shortcomings. 
The anti-trafficking security governance system consists of five
approaches: legal measures, prosecution, protection, prevention in
countries of origin, and prevention in countries of destination.
Although progress has been made, the security governance system is
marked by several pathologies, especially a lack of programs that 
prevent trafficking in countries of origin and destination, insufficient
protection for trafficked persons, and deficient networks bringing
together the various actors involved in anti-trafficking. To make gover-
nance against human trafficking more effective, efficient, and just, the
security governance system must be better balanced and networked.
Keywords human trafficking • governance • European security •
crime • networks • Southeast Europe
Introduction
HUMAN TRAFFICKING ranks high on the European security agenda.Over recent years, the link between human trafficking and organizedcrime, fears over illegal migration, and the violent nature of traffick-
ing have caused significant concern among policymakers and the public.
This article examines strategies against human trafficking. It focuses on the
trafficking of women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation, which
has been at the center of the debate over trafficking. Human trafficking also
encompasses the trafficking of men and boys for sexual exploitation, the 
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trafficking of males and females for labor exploitation, the ‘mail-order bride’
business, the trade in children offered for adoption, and the illicit trade in
human organs. 
This article conceptualizes efforts against sex trafficking and explains their
shortcomings. The concept of security governance offers valuable insights.
The first part of the article describes human trafficking and counter-efforts.
The second part underlines the usefulness of the concept of security govern-
ance for analyzing counter-efforts. The third part shows that anti-trafficking
efforts have evolved into a system of security governance that consists of five
approaches: legal measures, prosecution, protection, prevention in countries
of origin, and prevention in countries of destination. The fourth part under-
lines the pathologies of security governance that have hampered action
against trafficking. The geographic focus is on Southeast Europe, a promi-
nent region of origin and destination, and the European Union (EU), where
many trafficked people arrive.
Human Trafficking and Counter-Efforts
The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children was signed in December 2000 in Palermo,
Italy, and entered into effect in December 2003. According to the Protocol,
‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring,
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability,
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.1
The Protocol also stipulates that the ‘consent of the victim of trafficking in
persons to the intended exploitation set forth in paragraph (a) of this article
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (b) have
been used’. A distinction is often made between human smuggling and
human trafficking. The latter implies a more permanent relationship between
trafficker and trafficked person and higher risks of deception and abuse than
the former. In reality, of course, there are varying degrees of consent, and the
distinction between smuggling and trafficking is not clearcut.
Over recent years, there have been numerous, and often sensationalist,
reports on sex trafficking. Observers who describe trafficking as a modern
slave trade (see, for example, Masci, 2004) tell stories of psychological and
380 Security Dialogue vol. 38, no. 3, September 2007
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physical torture, rape, drugging, and murder. Such representations present
trafficking predominantly as an organized-crime problem, neglect the social
and economic conditions that lead women to migrate, and overemphasize
the naïvité of ‘sex slaves’. The anti-trafficking campaign has strong moralistic
undertones and has been instrumentalized by a conservative Christian-
feminist coalition in the United States whose aim is to abolish all forms of
prostitution (for critiques, see Berman, 2003; Soderlund, 2005). Nevertheless,
it is is true that many women work as prostitutes in brothels and private
apartments, ‘entertainers’ in bars, and ‘actors’ in pornography films under
appalling conditions.
Trafficked people generally come from places where economic and social
difficulties make migration a popular choice. Women are often recruited by
strangers or acquaintaces (often women themselves) who promise well-paid
jobs abroad. Many of those who accept the offer to migrate have their pass-
ports taken away and receive no income at all for their work in the sex indus-
try, or are forced to work off bogus debts. While some women expect to work
in the sex industry when taking their decision to migrate, few anticipate the
violence and exploitation to which many trafficked persons are exposed.
Owing to the clandestine nature of human trafficking and the paucity of
systematic empirical research (Laczko & Gramegna, 2003: 181), there are no
precise figures, and figures that do exist vary. The US government estimates
the number of people trafficked across borders at 600,000 to 800,000, of whom
80% are female and up to 50% minors (US Department of State, 2005: 6). Most
victims are thought to work in the sex industry. It is estimated that human
trafficking yields almost $10 billion in profits every year (US Department of
State, 2005: 13–14). The International Labour Organization (2005: 10) reports
that of the 12.3 million people in forced labour worldwide, 2.4 million are 
victims of trafficking, both internally and across borders. The industry gen-
erates annual profits of over $32 billion.
In Europe, the dimension of the problem is unclear as well. In 2003, the EU
reported that Balkan criminal networks traffick around 200,000 women per
year for the sex trade (Solana, 2003: 9). This figure is probably exaggerated. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, only 66 people were registered as
potential victims of trafficking in 2005 (State Coordinator, 2006: 30).
Germany, Europe’s main country of destination (UNHCR, 2005: 63), counted
642 trafficked persons for the same year (Bundeskriminalamt, 2006). To be
sure, most trafficking cases go unnoticed, and perceptions about the scale of
the problem vary significantly. To stay with the example of Bosnia, while the
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) says that it is unlikely that a very
high number of women and girls are trafficked within Bosnia, the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) states that trafficking in the
country has been pushed underground and that it is still a big industry.2
Cornelius Friesendorf Human Trafficking in Europe 381
2 Author interviews with representatives of international organizations, Sarajevo, August 2006.
 at LMU Muenchen on June 17, 2013sdi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Uncertainties and exaggerations notwithstanding, the problem has been
increasing in Europe since the end of the East–West conflict. The countries of
the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, and Southeast Europe have become
main regions of origin, transit, and also destination. Women from other
world regions have been trafficked through Southeast Europe, and women
from Southeast Europe, particularly from Albania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and
Romania, have been trafficked to the EU. Moreover, internal trafficking 
in Southeast Europe has risen sharply as well. In Kosovo and Bosnia, the
presence of tens of thousands of peacekeepers and other international staff
has exacerbated human trafficking. The primary reason is that some ‘interna-
tionals’ have fueled the demand for commercial sexual services, and that
some of the women providing these services have been trafficked. The
response of countries contributing personnel for NATO and United Nations
operations has initially been one of neglect and denial (Mendelson, 2005;
Vandenberg, 2005: 73–74; author interview with a trafficking expert of 
medica mondiale, 27 October 2006, Zurich).
Over recent years, numerous actors have joined efforts against human traf-
ficking. Besides governments, international organizations (IOs) formulate,
promote, and implement anti-trafficking programs. UN agencies, NATO, the
EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the
Council of Europe, and others are active in anti-trafficking. Moreover, non-
state actors are deeply involved. Numerous nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) promote and implement policies, and businesses participate as well.
Actors’ motivations to ‘fight’ trafficking varies. Governments are primarily
concerned about links between human trafficking and other forms of crime,
such as money laundering, drug trafficking, the illegal weapons trade, and
document forgery, as well as the risk of profits from human trafficking
financing terrorist activities. These fears are exacerbated, particularly in
wealthy countries, by concerns about illegal migration. Many NGOs, in con-
trast, emphasize that human trafficking is a serious human rights violation,
and that a focus on organized crime and illegal migration is inappropriate.
International organizations play a prominent role in anti-trafficking not least
because of significant funding opportunities. The same holds true for many
NGOs. Last, and as mentioned above, moral outrage about sexual slavery
and/or prostitution has also contributed to pushing human trafficking onto
the security agenda.
There has been an increase in research on human trafficking over recent
years. Authors (see Stoecker & Shelley, 2005; Haynes, 2004) often combine
description (how has human trafficking evolved, and which counter-
measures have been adopted?) with prescription (how can countermeasures
be improved?). Unfortunately, many authors present long lists of actors and
activities and arbitrarily single out presumed policy weaknesses. In other
words, research on counter-trafficking is under-theorized.
382 Security Dialogue vol. 38, no. 3, September 2007
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International relations (IR) research, on the other hand, has not applied its
theoretical and conceptual tools to human trafficking. This reflects the 
problem for IR of coming to terms with illicit non-state activities, which are
marked by complex non-linearity and a lack of data (Friesendorf, 2005). IR
scholars who do theorize human trafficking focus on criticizing the pre-
dominance of law enforcement in counter-trafficking (Berman, 2003). More
theoretically informed works are needed to illuminate changing political
practices and to reveal the pathologies of seemingly benign action. Security
governance is a particularly promising concept.
Security Governance and Human Trafficking
One remarkable trend in international security after the end of the East–West
conflict has been the growing importance of non-state actors pursuing crimi-
nalized activities across national borders. During the East–West conflict,
security practices and security debates focused on military issues negotiated
among a relatively small number of decisionmakers. The trafficking of
women, drugs, or diamonds is different. More individuals and groups are
involved, there is a higher degree of transnationalism, and trade patterns are
very complex. There are thousands of human traffickers operating inde-
pendently, within relatively hierarchical groups, or as part of decentralized
networks. These traffickers exploit tens or even hundreds of thousands of
women and girls, often in cross-border operations that violate countries’ 
sovereignty. The causes of human trafficking are multifaceted, and so are the
consequences. Negotiating and implementing arms control agreements was
(and is) not easy, but negotiating and implementing adequate responses to
human trafficking is even more difficult.
How can efforts against human trafficking be conceptualized and their
shortcomings explained? The concept of security governance is particularly
useful. According to Elke Krahmann, who has played a central role in
developing the concept, security governance relates to the emergence of 
governance in general: ‘Governance denotes the structures and processes
which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their independ-
ent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding
policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority’ (Krahmann,
2003: 11).
This definition refers to two elements that characterize efforts against
human trafficking: the limits of hierarchical government and the participa-
tion of private actors in governance. Traditional national hierarchical
decisionmaking and implementation structures are unable to reduce the
transnational trafficking of people or goods. To address human trafficking
Cornelius Friesendorf Human Trafficking in Europe 383
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and other illicit activities of non-state actors, governments have to step up
transnational cooperation, work together with NGOs and private businesses,
and act within and alongside international organizations. Efforts against
human trafficking are thus a prime example of the paradigmatic shift from
government to governance (Czempiel & Rosenau, 1992) and, more specific-
ally, security governance. The functional need to address the various causes
and consequences of human trafficking effectively, efficiently, and justly, as
well as institutional and ideological dynamics (some of which were men-
tioned above), have led to the incremental creation of a complex security
governance system against human trafficking.
But what are the criteria for successful security governance against crimi-
nalized activities such as human trafficking, with success defined in terms of
crime reduction? It is not enough to say that anti-trafficking efforts must 
be non-hierarchical and include non-state actors. It is important to specify
what replaces hierarchy, and how the public and private actors constituting
a security governance system are interlinked.
Three criteria can be derived from the theoretical literature on governance
and networks and the empirical literature examining past and present strate-
gies against criminalized non-state activities. The first criterion pertains to the
need for transnational cooperation among various actors; the second to the
need for well-balanced governance arrangements reflecting the nature of the
problem that is to be addressed; and the third to the need for networks among
actors pursuing any one governance approach (such as transnational law
enforcement networks), as well as networks between actors pursuing different
approaches (such as networks between police and human rights NGOs). 
First, for security governance to be successful, and for crime transgressing
national borders to be reduced, states must intensively cooperate with one
another. However, transnational governance is not about one unitary state
cooperating with another unitary state. Rather, fostering flexible forms of
governance requires states to disaggregate into their functionally differenti-
ated parts, as emphasized by Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004). On criminal 
matters, police officials, border guards, customs officers, prosecutors, judges,
and intelligence agents cooperate with their foreign counterparts. Police
forces of various countries, for example, were already exchanging informa-
tion during the 19th century and before. Since the end of the East–West con-
flict, and particularly after 9/11, transnational police cooperation has been
intensifying dramatically (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). 
The complexity, and indeed messiness, of security governance is further
enhanced by the presence of international organizations, NGOs, and private
businesses in governance arrangements. States, even when disaggregated,
can only do so much against complex security problems. They must draw on
the expertise and material resources of IOs and private actors (Caparini,
2006). Reducing the risk that violent conflict erupts or re-erupts hinges on a
384 Security Dialogue vol. 38, no. 3, September 2007
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stable economy, and thus on private investments. Private companies must
therefore be drawn into conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and
peacebuilding efforts (Wenger & Möckli, 2003). With regard to human 
trafficking, women’s rights groups are better suited to support victims of
trafficking than police forces, who know much more about arresting crimi-
nals than about the needs of trafficked persons. 
The second of the three criteria for successful security governance identified
above pertains to policy strategies (in contrast, criteria 1 and 3 pertain more to
the institutional structure of the governance system).3 Security governance
must reflect the nature of the problem. The more complex the problem, the
more multifaceted must be the governance system. If a problem is caused not
only by the greed of criminals but also by poverty, the success of governance
depends on poverty reduction. ‘If governance is to be effective, it needs to be
strategic. Any chance of real success requires an integrated comprehensive
approach’ (Williams & Baudin-O’Hayon, 2003: 142). Equally important, secu-
rity governance must balance the different approaches constituting the gover-
nance system in order to ensure that the causes and consequences of a problem
are properly addressed. ‘Soft’ policy elements must be more than tokens to
prevent strategies from being overly repressive, and thus ineffective (for an
analysis of unbalanced post-conflict reconstruction efforts, see Law, 2006).
The third criterion for successful security governance pertains to networks
among and between actors constituting the governance system. Networks
are core elements of security governance.4 They are decentralized arrange-
ments in which multiple actors (nodes) sharing an interest in a specific 
issue area are dispersed and loosely connected. Exchange can be formal and
institutionalized, but is more often informal and voluntary (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2005: 7; Krahmann, 2005: 25). Networks are often associated
with ‘dark networks’ (Raab & Milward, 2003) – that is, illicit structures that
benefit from new information technologies and other features of globaliza-
tion. Human trafficking is largely a networked activity, with various traffick-
ing groups reducing operational risks through decentralized action.
Although the structure of trafficking networks differs, most lack a center 
of gravity, such as a boss that can be arrested. And, even if one network is 
dismantled, another one will replace it. 
The networked structure of human trafficking forces governments to adopt
flexible, functionally differentiated forms of cooperation themselves. ‘It takes
networks to fight networks’ (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001: 15). Anti-trafficking
networks can have hierarchical features, as is the case when one government,
Cornelius Friesendorf Human Trafficking in Europe 385
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ministry, agency, NGO, or international organization takes the lead in
addressing a specific cause or consequence of trafficking. However, horizon-
tal networks are at least as important as vertical ones, if not more so, since
they bring together a host of different actors operating across borders
(Krahmann, 2005: 24) who would be generally unwilling to accept the lead of
any one actor. 
Indeed, for security governance to work, it is vital that there are networks
not only among actors pursuing the same governance approach (such as
police, border guards, and prosecutors, all of whom pursue a law enforce-
ment and criminal justice approach), but also between actors pursuing 
different approaches (such as networks between the police focusing on the
prosecution of traffickers and NGOs focusing on the protection of trafficked
persons). Peacebuilding efforts, for example, have often suffered from insuf-
ficient networking between the security and development communities (see
Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). Networks are thus needed among actors with a
similar outlook and between actors with a different outlook. 
More generally, and no matter whether networks are hierarchical or decen-
tralized, or how many actors they include: networking must not be obstructed
by red tape, the failure to exchange information, and zero-sum games between
networked actors.
Hence, successful security governance against human trafficking depends
on intense transnational cooperation among specialized state agencies, 
and on the participation of international organizations, NGOs, and private
businesses in policymaking and implementation. Moreover, security gover-
nance must be multifaceted, and there must be a balance between different
policy approaches in order to address the various causes and consequences
of trafficking. Last, networks are needed among and between actors consti-
tuting the security governance system. Has the anti-trafficking governance
system met these requirements for effective, efficient, and just action? The
next two sections show that, although some progress has been made, several
pathologies have hampered, and continue to hamper, efforts against human
trafficking.
The Anti-Trafficking Security Governance System 
Since the late 1990s, a host of actors have joined the ‘fight’ against sex traffick-
ing. Counter-efforts have focused particularly on Southeast Europe, where
numerous anti-trafficking programs have been implemented. Main reasons
for this are the embarrassing implication of peacekeepers in human traffick-
ing and the perceived need to combat organized crime in Southeast Europe
as a precondition for peace and democracy in the region and for crime reduc-
386 Security Dialogue vol. 38, no. 3, September 2007
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tion in the EU. Table 1 provides an overview of governance approaches,
activities, and dominant actors.
The terms prosecution, protection, and prevention are commonly used 
in the literature on human trafficking (‘the three Ps’). The table adds legal
measures to the three Ps. The adoption of new laws and the harmonization 
of existing ones provide the legal basis for prosecution, protection, and pre-
vention. Moreover, the table distinguishes between prevention in countries
of origin and destination. After all, prevention of trafficking in Germany by
way of assisting immigrants is different from prevention of trafficking in
Moldova by way of assisting would-be emigrants.
Two caveats are in order. First, the analysis brackets anti-trafficking efforts
in transit countries. Second, the five governance approaches, which comple-
ment each other, are ideal-types with significant overlap, for example
Cornelius Friesendorf Human Trafficking in Europe 387
Table 1: Governance against human trafficking in Europe
Governance approach Activity Dominant actors
Legal measures • Criminalization of trafficking IOs
• Harmonization of laws  Governments
NGOs 
Prosecution • Arrest of traffickers Governments
• Zero-tolerance policies IOs 
• Asset seizure and forfeiture International authorities 
• Capacity-building
• Creation of databases
• Witness protection programs
• Border controls
• Anti-corruption efforts
Protection • Identification of trafficked persons IOs 
• Hotline services NGOs 
• Sheltering and counseling Governments
• Medical and psychological support Businesses
• Reintegration of trafficked persons
• Private-sector programs
Prevention in countries • Awareness campaigns IOs
of origin • Empowering high-risk groups NGOs 
• Measures against discrimination Governments
• Assisting migrant workers
• Research on trafficking
• Development policy 
Prevention in countries of • Migration policy Governments
destination • Awareness campaigns NGOs
• Prostitution policies Businesses
• Private-sector programs 
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between protection and prevention: The reintegration of trafficked persons
into their home communities reduces the likelihood of re-trafficking and thus
has a preventive effect. Hotlines not only help trafficked persons, but also
inform potential victims about migration risks and opportunities. And the
identification of a trafficked person has a preventive effect if achieved before
that person is forced to work in the sex industry, that is, during the migration
process.
The first approach pertains to legal measures. Over recent years, European
countries have included human trafficking as a criminal offense in their
penal codes and, to some extent, harmonized their anti-trafficking laws. IOs
are at the forefront of setting new legislative standards, such as the 2000 UN
Protocol, the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Traffick-
ing in Human Beings, various acts of EU institutions, and the OSCE Action
Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings. NGOs have played a promi-
nent role in promoting many of these initiatives.
Prosecution has a central position in the anti-trafficking governance system.
The UN Protocol, which is relatively strong on law enforcement and weak on
human rights protection, has served as a catalyst for coercive initiatives on
the regional, national, and local levels. Prosecution includes the arrest of 
traffickers and those who condone trafficking; the adoption and imple-
mentation of zero-tolerance policies intended to prevent peacekeepers from
purchasing sexual services;5 the seizure and forfeiture of traffickers’ assets;
security-sector capacity-building; the collection and exchange of information
about traffickers; the use of victims as witnesses in trials; reinforced borders;
and efforts against corruption. While prosecution is the traditional preroga-
tive of government agencies, IOs have become increasingly involved as well.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and IOM, for
example, help to train judicial and law enforcement institutions.
The third approach of the anti-trafficking governance system focuses on 
the protection of trafficked persons. IOs, governments, and various NGOs
identify trafficked persons; establish hotlines; provide trafficked persons
with safe housing, legal and professional advice, medical assistance, and 
psychological support; and reintegrate trafficked persons into their home
communities (or, if return is not an option, help them find a new place).
Reintegration can be achieved through grants and loans for setting up busi-
nesses; schooling and training; and family support. NGOs do most of the
work on the ground. They receive project-specific funding from governments
and international organizations such as the IOM, which became the lead
agency for return and reintegration within the framework of the Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe. Businesses are involved as well. Airlines and
388 Security Dialogue vol. 38, no. 3, September 2007
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May 2006).
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bus companies, for example, are being ‘deputized’ to help detect trafficked
people through stricter controls of travelers. The hospitality and tourism
industries have been asked to regulate themselves by increasing the aware-
ness of tourists and business travelers on trafficking. In addition, some hotels
provide high-risk groups with professional skills (Baumeister & Maley,
2005).
Prevention in countries of origin, the fourth governance approach, is one of
the most multifaceted. IOs, NGOs, and governments raise awareness about
the risks of accepting dubious migration and job offers; empower high-risk
groups such as Roma, orphans, or women with a history of family violence;
mitigate gender, ethnic, or religious discrimination; and inform those who
decide to migrate about bureaucratic procedures and their rights. Moreover,
research into the causes and consequences of trafficking is crucial for devis-
ing and implementing effective policies. Last, and most important, effective
prevention implies an improvement of the social and economic conditions
that lead people to take risky migration decisions. Development-oriented
efforts against trafficking must improve educational, medical, and social
infrastructures, and create viable employment opportunities, particularly for
women and minorities. Here, businesses have a role to play. They can teach
people skills for which there is a need on the labour market.
The last approach aims at prevention in countries of destination. Govern-
ments can reduce the risk of women being recruited by traffickers by offering
them legal migration and employment opportunities. Women from South-
east Europe who want to work in the EU need visas, work permits, and 
residency permits so as not to have to rely on criminals who offer migration,
accommodation, and employment services. Governments can also legalize
the presence of foreign victims of trafficking. Moreover, awareness cam-
paigns that inform clients of prostitutes about trafficking can help reduce the
demand for trafficked persons and, thus, traffickers’ profits. Prostitution
policies may also have an impact on demand, as shown further below. Main
protagonists of prevention are governments, because migration and prostitu-
tion policies are national prerogatives. However, NGOs are active in
demand-reduction efforts through awareness campaigns. Businesses play a
role as well. For example, entertainment companies should ensure that
‘cabaret’ dancers from Southeast Europe are not forced into prostitution.
Does the current anti-trafficking governance system meet the three criteria
for successful security governance outlined above? The first criterion has
largely been met: states have disaggregated into their functionally differenti-
ated parts, and these parts, or state agencies, have stepped up transnational
cooperation. Moreover, international organizations and private actors 
participate in anti-trafficking. But, with regard to the other two criteria,
developments over recent years have been less promising.
Cornelius Friesendorf Human Trafficking in Europe 389
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Pathologies of the Anti-Trafficking Security 
Governance System
Security governance against human trafficking does not fully meet the 
second and third criteria for successful governance. As Table 2 shows, 
counter-trafficking efforts have been suffering from serious shortcomings.
Legal Measures
Over recent years, some approaches have evolved faster than others. Legal
responses to trafficking are by now at an advanced stage. Some legal loop-
holes remain, and some regulatory efforts suffer from the non-binding nature
of many international agreements. However, most European countries have
adopted legislation against human trafficking. Interestingly, Southeast
European states generally have better laws against trafficking than old EU
member-states in Western Europe, since the adoption of new laws in the
criminal field is now a central precondition for becoming a member of the EU.
390 Security Dialogue vol. 38, no. 3, September 2007
Table 2: Pathologies of governance against human trafficking in Europe
Governance approach Status Pathologies
Legal measures Advanced • Lack of adequate legislation in some countries
• Many non-binding guidelines
Prosecution Relatively advanced • Arrest and deportation of trafficked persons
• Lenient sentences for traffickers
• Reluctance of military to do police work
• Trafficking has been driven underground
• Red tape and corruption
Protection Developing • Short-term funding priorities
• Governments donate to ‘their’ NGOs
• Deficient witness-protection programs
• Deficient reintegration programs
• Lack of networked cooperation 
Prevention in countries Neglected • Deficient awareness-raising campaigns
of origin • Lessons learned not documented or shared 
• Development decoupled from anti-trafficking
Prevention in countries Contested • Few migration and job opportunities
of destination • Reinforced borders benefit traffickers
• Insufficient demand-reduction efforts
• No ‘perfect’ prostitution policy
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Prosecution
Prosecution is relatively advanced, with significant progress made over
recent years. To be sure, law enforcement and criminal justice responses to
trafficking are far from perfect. Often, trafficked women have been, and con-
tinue to be, arrested and deported for having violated migration and/or
prostitution laws, which obviously makes them reluctant to testify against
traffickers. In other cases, police, following bar raids, has referred only those
women to shelters who agree to become witnesses for the prosecution, or
have demanded unconditional access to shelters (Limanowska, 2005a: 28).
On paper, the UN Protocol and other agreements emphasize the need to 
orient law enforcement pressure against the traffickers, but in practice police
have taken a more non-discriminatory approach (Haynes, 2004). Suspicion
among victims is nurtured also by the fact that convicted traffickers often
receive relatively lenient sentences (UNHCR, 2005), not least because courts
perceive human trafficking as a less serious form of crime than the trade in
drugs or weapons.
The reluctance of the military to engage in law enforcement has been 
another obstacle for firm action against traffickers. In recent years, the 16,000-
strong Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been reluctant to support efforts of the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) against organized crime.6 The
5,500-strong European Union Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia has similarly limited
its role to law enforcement support.7 This division of labor could be justified
on the grounds that military forces lack law enforcement expertise, and 
military-style law enforcement poses problems of accountability and legiti-
macy. However, it comes at a cost: Police in Southeast Europe often do not
have the manpower and technology to attack the more sophisticated and 
violent trafficking networks. In Bosnia, a senior police official in the Ministry
of Interior said that four of his inspectors tasked with fighting organized
crime had to share one computer – which was broken.8
When police do act, they push the industry underground. While trafficking
had been fairly visible in some parts of Southeast Europe in the 1990s, 
traffickers have since become much more cautious. They have switched from
brothels to private apartments, from landlines to mobile phones, and from
international to internal trafficking (Europol, 2006; author interviews with
senior police officers in Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia, July–August 2006).
These trends go hand in hand with a drop in the number of reported cases of
trafficking, both in Southeast Europe and in the EU. Governments tend to cite
this drop as an indicator of policy success, but it merely reflects the trans-
formation of the trafficking industry. Another problem is that transnational
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cooperation on criminal matters suffers from red tape and corruption, which
means that traffickers are sometimes not arrested or convicted (see the 
country reports in UNHCR, 2005).
However, despite the fact that traffickers have mastered the network struc-
ture much better than their enemies, the prosecution of traffickers has picked
up momentum over recent years. Indeed, prosecution is now one of the most
advanced governance approaches. The dominance of this approach over 
protection and prevention is indicated by the strong position of ministries of
the interior in national anti-trafficking arrangements (Limanowska, 2005b: 3).
EU policies in Southeast Europe further underline the hegemonic role of law
enforcement and criminal justice. The European Commission (2005: 3) calls
for ‘a coordinated policy response notably in the area of freedom, security
and justice, external relations, development cooperation, social affairs and
employment, gender equality and non-discrimination’. However, there is 
little evidence that the EU has pursued holistic policies that integrate the 
various EU policy instruments in a balanced way. Trafficking is framed pre-
dominantly as an issue of justice and home affairs; capacity-building, the
buzzword of EU policy in the region, has meant little more than strengthen-
ing security agencies, particularly through the CARDS program (Commu-
nity Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization). To be
sure, EU institutions and EU member-states have financed protection and
prevention programs as well. However, the bulk of funds have been destined
for law enforcement and criminal justice (Lindstrom, 2004: 51).
Protection
The protection of victims is relatively advanced in some respects, yet remains
deficient in others. The popularity of anti-trafficking action has led to the 
creation of numerous shelters for trafficked women in Southeast Europe, but
funding for other programs has been reduced, such as for programs assisting
victims of domestic violence.9 Such short-term donor policies are counter-
productive, since domestic violence is one of the factors pushing women to
take risky migration decisions. Further problems are the short duration of
many anti-trafficking programs and government support for ‘willing con-
tractor’ NGOs whose spending decisions and implementation practices 
governments can control (Limanowska, 2005b: 53).
Moreover, witness programs do not afford women sufficient incentives and
protection to testify against traffickers (El-Cherkeh et al., 2004: 23–24). In
Germany, for example, requirements on the cooperation of women with
prosecutors are excessive. Women are offered a ‘reflection period’ of only
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four weeks, during which they have to decide whether they want to testify
against traffickers to obtain a temporary residence permit – a rather short
period given that some women have been traumatized. NGOs are not 
afforded the right to refuse to give evidence in court, making these NGOs an
unreliable partner for women who have broken migration or prostitution
laws. And, since there is generally only one recovery center for trafficked
women per German state, women have reason to fear reprisals by traffickers
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2006). The obvious consequence of a lack of protection
is that few trafficked people agree to become witnesses for the prosecution.
Another, major, shortcoming of protection is a lack of sustainable reinte-
gration programs. In Southeast Europe, there is not enough funding to 
provide trafficked persons with the security, psychological and medical help,
economic support, skills training, and job counseling needed to avoid re-
trafficking.10 Also, many women refuse the assistance offered to them
because they fear collusion between state agencies and traffickers, or depor-
tation to the country or community they had wanted to get away from.
A further pathology of victim protection (and of other approaches) is a lack
of networking. As outlined above, for security governance to work, actors 
constituting the governance system must be networked. In anti-trafficking,
stakeholders have often proven unable or unwilling to properly coordinate
their work (Kanics et al. , 2005: 66–67). Cooperation problems are apparent
among actors pursuing the same security governance approach and between
actors pursuing different security governance approaches. The director of a
women’s rights NGO in Bulgaria, talking about the challenges of effective and
efficient networking, likens the anti-trafficking system to a ‘jungle’.11
For example, there has been, and continues to be, a lack of cooperation
among EU donor countries, who simply inform each other about their policy
priorities in Southeast Europe.12 Similarly, cooperation among NGOs protect-
ing trafficked persons has proven problematic in Southeast Europe and the EU
owing to a lack of funding that would allow NGOs to organize regular 
meetings on the local, national, and international levels in order to agree on
common strategies and their implementation (El-Cherkeh et al., 2004: 98).
Further, international organizations do not represent a unified front against
trafficking: ‘Every agency has carved out its own little turf.’13 While a division
of labor potentially mitigates agency rivalries, a senior IO official said that 
the ‘terrible competition’ for funding in the field of anti-trafficking is unlike
anything he saw in other policy fields.14 Moreover, deficient networking
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between IOs and local NGOs, and among large international and small local
NGOs, translates into a lack of local ownership, depriving projects of vital
local expertise.15 Finally, relations between the security sector and NGOs 
have improved significantly over recent years, but still suffer from mutual
suspicions and the frequent failure to exchange information.
Prevention in Countries of Origin
The fourth governance approach, the prevention of trafficking in countries of
origin, has been neglected over recent years. Prevention has not evolved
much beyond awareness-raising campaigns informing people about traffick-
ing, despite doubts over the effectiveness of awareness campaigns. Worse,
campaigns can be counterproductive. Some campaigns in Southeast Europe
have been perceived as anti-migration campaigns that instrumentalize traf-
ficking in order to reduce migration to the EU (Limanowska, 2005b: 21–22).
In Albania, shock tactics employed in campaigns have led some families to
forbid their daughters to leave the house (Dottridge, 2006: 51). Moreover,
campaigns are implemented in an ad hoc and uncoordinated manner. In
Kosovo, one anti-trafficking campaign begun in late 2005 was followed, a few
weeks later, by another campaign, to the surprise of almost everyone
involved in anti-trafficking in Kosovo.16 Moreover, lessons learned from
campaigns have generally not been documented and shared.
Yet these problems pale when compared to the lack of development-
oriented anti-trafficking programs. Economic and social root causes of 
trafficking include unemployment, poverty, discriminatory practices, a lack
of access to education and medical services, and domestic violence. In
Southeast Europe, these problems have been caused or aggravated by war,
reckless privatization, and structural adjustment programs that have exacer-
bated the ‘feminization of poverty’. Few programs in Southeast Europe so far
have systematically addressed the economic and social root causes that push
women to seek a better life abroad. The main reason for this has been a lack
of donor interest in development-oriented prevention programs proposed by
international organizations (Limanowska, 2005b: 9), as well the neglect of a
labour-market perspective. While Southeast Europe counts numerous devel-
opment initiatives, they generally lack anti-trafficking components – which
means that economic development helps potential victims of trafficking only
coincidentally. Moreover, skills training programs were rarely based on
sound research identifying labour market needs. To make matters worse,
agencies promoting gender equality, the rights of children, social support,
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and efforts against HIV/AIDS have not systematically mainstreamed anti-
trafficking components within their activities.
This neglect of prevention in countries of origin reflects the enormous 
challenge of development in Southeast Europe, but also the predominance 
of law enforcement, which results from the political priority of reducing
unwanted migration. Under the banner of anti-trafficking programs, funds
have often been destined to create databases of migrants, reinforce borders,
and strengthen law enforcement agencies.17
Prevention in Countries of Destination
The fifth security governance approach focuses on prevention as well, but in
countries of destination. This approach is highly contested, since counter-
trafficking demands a rethinking of migration and labor policies. Traffickers
have been benefiting from a lack of legal migration and employment oppor-
tunities that EU countries offer to non-EU citizens. Anti-trafficking policies
that grant visas, residency, and work permits to potential or actual victims 
of trafficking would reduce trafficking. The lifting of visa restrictions for
Romanians by the EU in 2002, for example, was followed by a drop in the
number of assisted Romanian victims of trafficking (El-Cherkeh et al., 2004:
51). However, negative perceptions of migrants prevent the systematic
embracing of this strategy. Over the 1990s, policymakers and the general 
public have increasingly ‘securitized’ migration (Huysmans, 2000). Irregular
migrants, and particularly migrants working in the sex industry, are seen as
transgressors of migration and prostitution laws, as well as violators of norms
of decency. This helps to explain the frequent arrest of trafficked persons by
the police, who generally represent conservative, male segments of societies.
The negative image of migrant prostitutes means that EU countries extend
residence permits to trafficked persons only for short periods, and only if
they testify against traffickers (Goodey, 2003: 169), a practice that has not
been substantially altered over recent years.18 An OHCHR official confirmed
that there is a lack of political will to use the migration lever for empowering
trafficked persons: the OHCHR largely failed in its attempts to introduce
legal migration and residence provisions into the 2005 Council of Europe
Convention on Action Against Human Trafficking.19
The securitization of migration has led to the reinforcement of ‘Fortress
Europe’. Yet, more border guards and the use of sophisticated technology
actually benefit illicit entrepreneurs. They force migrants to seek help from
smugglers, who may turn out to be traffickers (see International Crisis
Group, 2005). Moreover, stronger borders are not a panacea for identifying
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trafficked persons: During the migration process, many women are not
aware that they are being trafficked, and thus do not want to be detected.
Slipping information leaflets containing hotline numbers into the passports
of potential victims at borders addresses this problem, yet is an intervention
that comes relatively late during the trafficking circuit. Prevention should
commence earlier.
Prevention, in countries of both origin and destination, also suffers from
insufficient demand reduction. The implementation of prohibition regimes is
particularly difficult when there is a resilient demand for goods or services
(Nadelmann, 1990). This is the case with sexual services. There are still not
enough awareness campaigns informing potential or actual buyers of sexual
services about human trafficking (Howe, 2005: 99).
A major reason for the lack of demand-oriented awareness campaigns is
that such campaigns are inextricably linked to prostitution policies. The
debate over prostitution is an ideological minefield, a fact that limits the 
ability of international organizations to address clients of prostitutes.20
Prostitution laws differ widely across Europe, and there are few signs of 
harmonization. Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzer-
land have regulated or partially legalized the purchasing and selling of 
sexual services, hoping that the registration of prostitutes would empower
women vis-à-vis pimps or bar owners. Women’s rights groups defending
legalization argue that criminalizing prostitution deprives women of their
agency – that is, their ability to freely decide what to do with their bodies.
These groups speak of sex workers instead of survivors. Other countries such
as France favor an abolitionist prostitution policy. Abolitionist governments
and NGOs decry the commodification of female bodies through prostitution.
As an adviser to the Swedish government writes, ‘males who use women and
girls in prostitution are sexual predators and rapists’ (Ekberg, 2002: 8).
Even if one does not accept the mantra of abolitionists that prostitution is
inevitably about rape and exploitation, and that the distinction between con-
sensual prostitution and coerced trafficking is a false one, it may well be the
case that prostitution regimes influence trafficking patterns. It is not clear
which prostitution policy is best suited to reduce trafficking, but there are
indications that the legalization of prostitution is not a panacea against 
trafficking. As shown in Germany after the introduction in 2002 of a law that
legalizes prostitution, many prostitutes do not register and sign work con-
tracts with brothel owners, not least because they do not want to pay the 
relatively high social security contributions and taxes (Holm, 2005).
Moreover, foreign prostitutes, who constitute the majority of people working
in the sex industry, are not eligible to register, since they do not have resi-
dency and work permits. Pimps and brothel owners continue to exploit these
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women. And, even if legalization leads to better working conditions for 
registered prostitutes, these prostitutes might stay in the business longer.
Traffickers would continue to make money, because of constant client
demand for young women and girls.21 Hence, legalization might not break
the link between organized crime and the sex industry, but rather strengthen
it, encourage the growth of the sex industry, and increase trafficking (Bindel
& Kelly, 2003: 13–15; Hughes, 2000: 646–648). Yet, the criminalization of 
prostitution is not a smart option either. The US example illustrates the 
negative effects of law enforcement pressure on women, who have been 
victimized by pimps, clients, and the police (Weitzer, 1999).
Sweden has adopted an innovative, and hotly debated, policy: In 1999, the
government legalized the selling of sexual services and criminalized the 
purchase of such services. According to the Swedish government, this 
strategy was followed by a reduction in sex trafficking to Sweden (e-mail to
the author from Madeleine Elgemyr, Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employ-
ment and Communications, 7 March 2006; Bindel & Kelly, 2003: 25, 29). The
government argues that, instead of pushing the industry underground, the
law has created an anti-prostitution climate and has made the country 
unattractive to traffickers.
However, evidence that the policy has reduced trafficking is sketchy, and
the Swedish model is unpopular in other EU countries – as illustrated by the
German government’s tolerance towards prostitution during the 2006
Football World Cup, which has drawn acid comment from abolitionists
(Neuwirth, 2006). While there is a trend to criminalize demand for services
provided by trafficked persons, implementing this policy is difficult. In many
cases, proving that a client knew that a prostitute was trafficked is impossible.
The discussion above shows that counter-trafficking efforts have not fully
met the second criterion for successful security governance. While the anti-
trafficking security governance system does encompass various approaches,
these are not properly balanced. Few initiatives have addressed the economic
and social root causes of trafficking, or reduced the demand for trafficked
women, and trafficked persons have not received sufficient protection. The
hegemony of prosecution indicates the perception of trafficking as an organ-
ized crime and migration problem. Anti-trafficking policies are ‘skewed and
imbalanced, focus too much on law enforcement, and are marked by wrong
attitudes of cops’.22
Moreover, shortcomings have also been detected with regard to the third
criterion, which stipulates networking as a precondition for successful secu-
rity governance. Networked relations are relatively smooth among some
actors, especially among law enforcement and criminal justice institutions.
However, anti-trafficking networks still have many weaknesses, especially
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those networks bringing together different types of actors pursuing different
governance approaches.
Conclusion
History shows the inadequacy of coercive strategies against complex social
problems. The late 19th and early 20th century saw a reduction in the 
number of women trafficked from Europe to the USA for prostitution.
Although international agreements against the transatlantic ‘White Slave
Trade’ mitigated the trade, contingent conditions such as the equalization of
the sex ratio in the USA were more important (Nadelmann, 1990: 513–516). In
the second half of the 20th century, law enforcement within the USA had not
abolished prostitution, but instead harmed prostitutes (Weitzer, 1999).
Similarly, despite its decade-old military-style ‘war on drugs’, the USA has not
reduced illicit drug supplies. Instead, coercion has coincided with a world-
wide growth of the drug industry, and exacerbated corruption and human
rights abuses (Friesendorf, 2005). Most US drug policymakers regard illicit
drug supplies primarily as a criminal and not a socio-economic problem.
Although sex trafficking would continue even if counter-efforts found a
balance between prosecution, protection, and prevention, a better govern-
ance system would reduce trafficking. Governance must be more preventive.
In countries of origin, counter-trafficking must reduce poverty and discrimi-
nation. In countries of destination, progress against trafficking requires a
rethinking of narrow-minded migration policies. Extending migration and
employment opportunities to people who risk being trafficked would not
only help these people, but also rejuvenate an aging Western Europe.
Destination countries must devise better strategies for reducing the demand
for trafficked women both through awareness campaigns and through the
systematic, unideological evaluation of the impact of different prostitution
regimes on trafficking patterns.
In addition to more balanced security governance, there is a need for better
networked governance. While criminal networks are fast and flexible, the
same cannot be said about anti-trafficking networks. Red tape, corruption,
competition for funding, different agency mandates and worldviews, institu-
tional inertia, and the frequent turnover of personnel (successful networking
hinges on good personal relationships) hamper effective networking among
and between the stakeholders involved in counter-trafficking. To be sure,
networking has improved. Helga Konrad, the OSCE’s first Special Repre-
sentative for anti-trafficking, fostered cooperation in order to move away
from separate projects toward concerted action. In the framework of the
Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons established in July 2004, she con-
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vened regular meetings at the political and expert level. In Southeast Europe,
the OSCE established National Referral Mechanisms (NRMs), which are
intended to ensure that governments protect and promote the human rights
of trafficked persons and prosecute traffickers. NRMs bring together various
national stakeholders who negotiate adequate and flexible responses to 
trafficking. Hence, NRMs cut across the different approaches constituting the
anti-trafficking governance system.
This positive example notwithstanding, it is unlikely that networked anti-
trafficking efforts will greatly improve in the near future. The failure to
acknowledge that the success of one’s own approach partially depends on
the success of other approaches continues to hamper progress. There is no
trade-off, for example, between law enforcement and protection: the closer
police work together with NGOs in protecting trafficked persons, the higher
the chances of successfully prosecuting traffickers. The fact that, in 2005, only
about half of all European countries have instituted interagency cooperation
mechanisms against human trafficking (UNHCR, 2005: 8) indicates the
bureaucratic and political obstacles to effective networking.
Strategies against human trafficking are a prime example of a major change
in international relations: the change from government to governance.
Government is unable to cope with this complex challenge. Well-calibrated
and networked security governance is the only viable option, but the travails
and pathologies of anti-trafficking efforts underline that the shift from 
government to governance is not smooth.
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